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The 11 September attacks have brought the subjects of terrorism and coun-
tering terrorism back into “fashion.” They have also generated a flood of books,
scholarly, journalistic, and otherwise, with more — it seems — being published
daily. Not surprisingly, the quality and value of these volumes vary considerably.
Fortunately, Timothy Naftali’s is one of the best. Indeed, it is in a class by itself.
That is a result of the book’s provenance. Naftali, a historian and Associate
Professor at the University of Virginia, was contracted by the 9/11 Commission
to write an unclassified history of the early years of American counter-terrorism.
Based on extensive archival research in declassified documents and interviews
with officials involved, the study amounted to a “quasi-official history.” The
commission’s wisdom in allowing the author to publish it is to be commended.
Naftali has written a book that will be of great value to scholars and others inter-
ested in the subject.
One of the book’s major contributions is to place the current “War on
Terrorism” in historical context. Although its scale and scope is unique, this war
is not sui generic. Rather, it represents the latest iteration of a “war” that has been
underway for several decades. In fact, the story opens in the latter stages of the
Second World War when American counter-intelligence had to deal with alleged
Nazi plans to assassinate General Eisenhower and conduct a terrorist campaign
against Allied occupation forces. Neither threat materialized, so terrorism was
not a high priority immediately after the war. But in passages that eerily presage
post-11 September anxieties Naftali writes that after the Cuban Missile Crisis the
CIA warned the Kennedy administration that it would be possible to smuggle
small nuclear or chemical weapons into the United States. However, only the
Soviet Union had that capability and the US doubted that it was likely to take
such action.
The spate of airline hijackings in the late 1960s might have focussed US
policy-makers on terrorism. But hijackings to Cuba were almost routine; pas-
sengers usually were released unharmed after negotiations and minor conces-
sions. So, there was little incentive or enthusiasm to take firm action until the fall
of 1972. Then, the Munich massacre, a nearly disastrous domestic hijacking
(which included a threat to crash the plane into a nuclear reactor), and the threat
of a world-wide airline pilots’ strike, galvanized the Nixon administration into
taking the problem seriously. Full screening of passengers and hand luggage
began in January 1973, and the number of hijackings dropped to almost nil. From
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that point on, terrorism was on the agenda of every president, although its impor-
tance relative to other issues waxed and waned over time and between different
administrations. Naftali’s account confirms Walter Laqueur’s assertion in 1987
that the rhetoric about fighting terrorism was never matched by the allocation of
vital resources and attention to that fight. In more than one administration the
issue fell through the cracks or got bogged down in inter-agency “turf wars.” On
the eve of 11 September it was not a high priority for the Bush administration,
which was focussed on ballistic missile defence. The idea of a major foreign ter-
rorist attack on the US originating inside the country, Naftali concludes, was the
“blind spot” in American national security policy.
But that doesn’t mean terrorism always had been overlooked. In fact, at
times it became too all consuming.  Hezbollah’s kidnapping of Americans in
Lebanon in the 1980s caused a steady drumbeat of public pressure on the Reagan
administration by the hostages’ families to “do something” to secure their
release. The absence of viable alternatives led to the arms-for-hostages deal with
Iran, which mutated into the infamous Iran-Contra scandal that shook Reagan’s
presidency. 
But Naftali shows that the US chalked up a series of counter-terrorism vic-
tories as well. Through the 1970s the US government and Yasir Arafat commu-
nicated secretly by means of a “back-channel” — Fatah terrorist Ali Hassan
Salameh — with two positive results; it helped to nudge the PLO toward the
“two-state solution” and gave the West warnings that allowed them to thwart
attacks by some rival Palestinian groups. In fact, dismantling the most dangerous
of them — the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) — proved to be America’s great-
est counter-terrorism success. Using intelligence from sources in Eastern Europe,
where the ANO had arranged sanctuaries, the CIA penetrated the ANO’s finan-
cial network. Later, the US persuaded the Syrians to expel Abu Nidal himself,
and then, with help from the PLO, Jordan, and Israel, played upon Nidal’s para-
noia to destroy the organization from within. What followed was a series of
defections and internal reprisals that devastated the group. Working with
Peruvian authorities the CIA also played a role in their capture of Abimael
Guzman, leader of the Shining Path group. 
The author presents all of this in well-documented and highly readable
prose; indeed, at times it reads more like a thriller than what was once a govern-
ment study. This makes it both valuable for scholars and accessible to the inter-
ested public. 
Scholars will, of course, find points on which to criticize the book, and this
reviewer is no exception. I was struck that a few incidents I thought of as notable
were not mentioned: the Tupamaros’ kidnapping and murder of American police
official Dan Mitrione in Uruguay in 1970; the 1973 Palestinian firebombing of a
Pam Am airliner at Rome airport, which killed fourteen Americans; and the kid-
napping of US General James Dozier by the Red Brigades in Italy in 1981 (and
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his subsequent rescue by the Italian anti-terrorist unit). Did these events have any
impact on the development of US counter-terrorism policy? If so, it is not appar-
ent in the book.
With respect to policy itself, the book is perhaps a little too focussed and
this may reflect its origins. Naftali has put American counter-terrorism policy
under a microscope to good effect, but as a historian I was troubled by the lack
of wider context. Laqueur’s astute comment about the dichotomy between rhet-
oric and action on terrorism is germane here. It can be explained — at least in
part — by the policy priorities of different administrations. But those priorities
are largely absent through much of the book. One is inclined to ask: what else
was on the presidents’ desks and agendas when terrorism was being discussed?
For example, how important was terrorism as a policy issue compared to US-
Soviet arms control negotiations? Did the Reagan administration’s fixation on
Soviet sponsorship of terrorism have any impact on that centerpiece of strategic
policy? Likewise, America’s experience of terrorism in Lebanon was shaped to
a considerable extent by the actions of its ally Israel, but the book doesn’t set that
experience within the context of the wider US/Israeli strategic relationship that
was developing during the 1980s. Did the Americans come to share Israeli per-
ceptions of the problem, as some critics have suggested, and if so, did this influ-
ence its approach to counter-terrorism, for better or worse? Finally, US policies
and actions generated criticism both domestically and among its allies; the inter-
ception of the Achille Lauro hijackers and the air raid on Libya are cases in point.
But there is scant mention of public or allied dissent and whether it subsequent-
ly influenced decision-makers and their policies. Clearly, American policies were
not developed in a vacuum, but the reader could be forgiven for concluding that
this was the case.
Finally, scholars rarely pass up an opportunity to critique the use of
sources. Naftali has made excellent use of declassified primary sources in the
official and private archives and presidential libraries. These give the work its
authoritative stature and scholarly credentials. But he appears to have overlooked
a number of worthwhile secondary sources, such as William Regis Farrell’s The
U.S. Government Response to Terrorism (Westview, 1982), which was the first
to explore the inter-agency battles over counter-terrorism jurisdiction, starting
under the Nixon administration. Mark Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and
Reagan Policies (Greenwood, 1987) did the same for a later period. David C.
Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War on
Terrorism (Harper and Row, 1988) is a solid journalistic history of US counter-
terrorism in the Reagan era. Brent Wilson’s chapter on American efforts to count-
er international terrorism in this reviewer’s edited volume, The Deadly Sin of
Terrorism (Greenwood 1994) provides a scholarly perspective that spans the
period from the Nixon to the first Bush administration. This is not to suggest that
any of these studies comprised the last word on the subject, but rather that one
would expect to see them cited if only to demonstrate the author’s awareness of
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the full spectrum of extant writing on the subject — and to provide him with the
opportunity to correct the earlier record. On the other hand, to help substantiate
the dismantling of the ANO, he does cite journalist Patrick Seale’s book Abu
Nidal: A Gun for Hire (Random House, 1992), which advances the bizarre the-
sis that since Nidal’s operations were so damaging to the Palestinian cause he
must have been an Israeli agent. Naftali, of course, doesn’t buy that argument,
but nor does he use his book to discredit that conspiracy theory.
These limitations, however, are largely of interest only to the specialist
scholar and do not detract from the overall value of the book. The 9/11
Commission is to be commended for initiating this study and for choosing a
scholar and writer of Timothy Naftali’s calibre to write it for a public which
deserves such a balanced exploration of America’s counter-terrorism past. It is
likely to be the definitive work on the subject for the foreseeable future.
David A. Charters is a Professor of History at the University of New
Brunswick.
Born, Hans, and Ian Leigh.  Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards
and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies. Oslo: Publishing
House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005. 
To say that the business of national security has become increasingly com-
plex in the post-11 September world has become something of a cliché. Of
course, this does not make it untrue. Governments increasingly rely on security
and intelligence organizations, in turn elevating the risk of abuse of these servic-
es. In Making Intelligence Accountable, Dr. Hans Born, senior fellow at the
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, and Ian Leigh, co-
director of the Human Rights Centre and professor of law at Durham University,
compile a catalogue of best practices in the oversight of intelligence agencies.
They do so with an eye toward raising awareness of good governance in the field
of intelligence and encouraging sound security policy to protect agencies and cit-
izens against political abuse. By comparing and evaluating intelligence oversight
legislation from over 20 states, each with its own mix of organizational struc-
tures, democratic maturity, and political culture, Born and Leigh have assembled
perhaps the most comprehensive study of intelligence accountability methods to
date. 
While Making Intelligence Accountable reads more like an instruction
manual for intelligence oversight reform than it does an argumentative piece of
scholarship, one can still discern at least three main contentions. The authors’
first key claim is that the oversight of intelligence agencies is a responsibility
